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Introduction
Liquidity risk has played an important role in most of the historical banking crisis. Recent events are not different. The International Monetary Fund (2011) highlighted that banks failed in the 2007 financial crisis due to poor liquidity management and over reliance on short-term wholesale funding, which quickened the failure of a number of banks, for example, Lehman Brothers and Northern Rock. Consideration of an array of regulation and supervision reveals that regulatory environment is likely to impact on banks' risk-taking behaviour and bank performance. As in most cases, conflicting predictions about these regulations and supervision may raise concerns on how policymakers can effectively prevent banking crisis in the future. The belief that the recent turmoil has posed challenges to banks' liquidity risk management has attracted significant attention from the regulators, researchers and financial institutions across the globe. This study aims to investigate the relationships between liquidity risk, regulation and bank performance.
A substantial body of literature examines the relationships between bank performance, risktaking incentives, bank regulation and banking crises (Zhang and Daly, 2013; Agoraki et al., 2011; Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005) relative to credit risk and overall bank risk, however, the liquidity risk is omitted. Earlier literature has not investigated the extent to what bank performance is influenced by liquidity risk in the presence of different regulatory and supervisory practices. Furthermore, the studies on the impact of a wide range of regulation and supervisory practices on bank performance provide limited evidence (Tran, 2010; Barth et al., 2004) . On the other hand, the difference in the impact of regulatory and supervisory policies on bank performance between the bank-based and market-based system has been largely unexplored in the banking literature. Therefore, this research attempts to close these gaps by investigating the relationships between liquidity, bank regulation, supervision and performance. This paper aims to answer the following research questions: Is the relationship between liquidity risk and bank performance held for the pre-and post-crisis period? Do the regulation and supervision affect bank performance? Does the impact of regulation and supervision on bank performance differ from bank-based to market-based countries?
This paper employs a panel regression method and a sample of 27 countries in the European Union (EU) to investigate the relationship between liquidity risk and bank performance. The study suggests that banks holding large amount of liquid assets cannot perform well due to the opportunity cost of holding low-yielding assets, consistent with earlier studies (Arif and Anees, 2012; Bordeleau and Graham, 2010) . From a policy perspective, this study suggests that the policymakers should bear in mind the trade-off between the opportunity cost of holding low-yielding liquid assets and the resilience to liquidity shocks.
Additionally, different from Barth et al. 's (2004) study, the paper extends additional analysis on the impact of an array of regulatory and supervisory policies typically related to liquidity risk, including capital requirement, deposit insurance, official supervision, private monitoring practices and restriction on bank activities and bank performance. Barth et al. (2004) did not find evidence of the influence of capital regulatory index, official supervisory power index and restrictions on bank activities index on net interest margin. This paper is hence, different from Barth et al. (2004) with a distinctive contribution to literature that capital regulation, official supervision and restriction on bank activity policies are positively related to bank performance whereas deposit insurance and private monitoring practices have a negative relationship with bank profitability. This paper is the first study to examine the difference between bank-based and marketbased system in the relationships between liquidity risk, regulation, supervision and bank performance. From a policy perspective, the results of this research contribute to the regulatory reform after the recent financial crisis since the impacts of the same regulatory and supervisory policies are different from the bank-based and the market-based countries. The capital regulation and official supervision also work better in the market-based financial system than the bank-based counterpart. Deposit insurance scheme tends to decrease banks' profits in the bank-based and the market-based countries, while restriction on bank activities policy works well in both. Coefficient of private monitoring practices is insignificant in the bank-based countries but negatively related to bank performance in the marketbased countries. While the EU is the focus of the research, this study provides better understandings on the role of regulation and supervision in explaining bank performance, especially in the EU banks based in different financial systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. The empirical results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 reports the robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Liquidity Risk, Regulation, Supervision and Bank Performance

The Relationship between Liquidity Risk and Bank Performance
There is relevant literature related to an aggregate shortage of liquidity (Allen and Gale, 2000) . They view liquidity shortages arising from the banks' liability side, so the inherent constraint in demand deposit is regarded as the reason of bank runs and systemic fragility. In the findings of Allen and Gale (2000) , banks are linked through pooled investment and interbank loans. If banks find out that the liquidity demand exceeds the supply, linked banks fail and contagion then occurs. However, past researchers have not given much attention to the notion that banks create liquidity for depositors in their arguments.
Empirical researches prove a significant relationship between banks' risk-taking incentives and their performance (Stiroh, 2004) . However, regarding liquidity risk, the empirical results are limited. A more recent study of Naceur and Kandil (2009) , the ratio of net loans to customer and short-term funding is statistically significant and has a positive sign, implying that, there is a negative relationship between the profitability and the level of holding liquid assets; therefore, this research is consistent with the previous studies (Pasiouras and Kasmidou, 2007) . The ratio of loans to deposits is significant and positively related to net interest margins (Chortareas et al., 2011) . By using liquid asset to total asset ratio, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) found out that banks with high liquidity by holding a higher fraction of liquid assets in cash and government securities tend to have a lower net interest margin than banks with less liquid assets. In case the market is competitive for deposits, greater liquidity will be also negatively related to interest margins. Therefore, this discussion postulates the following hypothesis:
H1. Liquidity risk is negatively related to bank performance.
The Impact of Regulation and Supervision on the Banking Industry
The regulatory authorities have paid much attention to capital adequacy in order to stabilize the financial system (Awdeh et al., 2011; Naceur and Kandil, 2009 ). Naceur and Kandil (2009) found a clear illustration of capital adequacy ratio, which internalizes the risk for the shareholders, and increases return on assets for banks. However, there is no direct evidence of capital adequacy on net interest margin. In fact, the imposition of capital requirement can reduce risk-taking incentives (Chortareas, 2011 ). VanHoose (2007 argues that stricter capital requirement regulations may provide banks' incentive to replace loans with alternative forms of less risky assets, hence:
H2. Capital regulation is positively related to bank performance.
Interestingly, capital regulation has a relationship with deposit insurance and they play an important role in banks' policies toward depositors and creditors (Cooper and Ross, 2002) . Building research based on Hellmann et al.'s (2000 ) approach, Repullo (2004 proves that the combination of capital requirement and deposit rate ceiling can reduce risk-shifting incentives but lower bank profit. The reason is that, the costs of an increase in capital regulation are fully transferred to the depositors, therefore, reducing its profits. Since past studies did not address a direct prediction between deposit insurance and bank performance, this situation is hypothesized as follows:
H3. Deposit insurance causes a reduction in bank performance.
Earlier empirical results on the association between bank performance and official supervision are mixed. Some evidence provides a positive relationship between the official supervisory indicator and bank performance (Chortareas et al., 2011; Pasiouras et al., 2009 ). Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005) suggested that the higher the level of accounting and auditing requirement a country has, the more powerful supervisors could reduce bank risk-taking behaviour. Improving official supervisory power is positively related to improved bank performance via a number of channels such as lessening agency problems and reducing the likelihood of financial distress (Chortareas et al., 2011) , therefore:
H4. Official supervision is more likely to increase bank performance.
By acting as financial intermediaries, furthermore, banks grant loans and issue deposits to the economy. Also, by gathering information about borrowers (Hakenes, 2004) , banks create liquidity on both sides of the balance sheet (Diamond and Rajan, 2001 ). The empirical evidences of Levine (2005) and Barth et al. (2004) showed that private monitoring is related to better banking sector outcomes. Nevertheless, requirements of disclosures have a negative impact on efficiency because of direct cost incurred by releasing additional disclosures, preparing disclosure documents, maintaining investor -relations' departments, and especially the cost related to releasing sensitive information to the competitors (Duarte et al., 2008) . Similarly, private monitoring affects adversely the efficient operation in the banking sector (Chortareas et al., 2011) . Hence, the discussion posits the fifth hypothesis:
H5. Private monitoring practices will cause a decrease in bank performance.
Considering risk-taking incentives, moral hazard encourages banks to take risks and even riskier behaviour in case they are allowed to involve in a wide range of activities. Jalilian et al. (2007) proved that banks' businesses will be affected in term of regulation of limiting banks' activities because banks tend to involve in riskier activities to circumvent regulations in response to the higher regulation burden, and therefore affect their performance. However, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) found that restrictions to engage in non-traditional activities such as real estate, securities underwriting, insurance and on-financial firms help banks' margins become larger. Additionally, in the empirical evidence provided by Beltratti and Stultz (2009) , after accounting for country fixed effects, banks holding more liquid assets and more loans had better performance during the month after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and it is more interesting to find that those banks came from countries with higher restrictions on bank activities. In this situation:
H6. Restriction on bank activities is more likely to raise bank performance.
Data and Methodology
Regression Framework
Following the earlier literature (Nguyen, 2012; Chortareas et al., 2011; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) , the baseline model has been established as follows:
Where i refers to bank i, j indexes country j and t refers to time t. The lagged explanatory variable is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for each bank i in country j in year t-1.
represents a vector of industry-level variables in country j in year t, is a vector of country-specific control variables in country j in year t and is the error term. Net interest margin (NIM) is the dependent variable. Chortareas et al. (2011) defined NIM measures the gap between what bank earns from borrowers and what the bank pays depositors regarding to bank's function of asset transformation. The higher the NIM, the higher the margin bank is commanding, or the cheaper the funding bank is acquiring.
This study employs two measures of liquidity risk, including liquid assets to total assets ) in the main stage of the analysis and interbank ratio ) in the robustness test. Beltratti and Stultz (2009) suggested that more liquid assets can deal with financing difficulties and reduce liquidity risk, but lower the return. As a result, a negative coefficient sign will be expected. Kosmidou et al. (2006) stated that interbank ratio is captured by interbank assets and interbank liabilities (INTER).
The vector contains the bank-specific variables:
Bank size (SIZE): is equal to the logarithm of total bank assets, which is a common proxy for bank's size in research about bank performance (Goddard et al., 2004) . It is proved that the impact of a growing size on performance is positive to a certain degree. However, the effect of bank size may be negative in term of extremely large banks (Athanasoglou et al., 2008) . A negative relationship between bank size and bank performance is predicted.
Capital strength (EQAS):
is denoted by equity to total asset. Empirical evidence shows that capital is positively related to bank profitability (Goddard et al., 2004) . Ideally, a positive sign for EQAS is expected.
Deposit (DEPOSIT):
refers to a ratio of deposit to total assets. When money markets work poorly and interbank lending is difficult, deposit financing helps banks to be more stable in financing. Beltratti and Stultz (2009) proved that an increase in deposit will raise banks' profitability, so a positive coefficient sign is expected.
Loan (LOAN):
characterises the asset side of the banks by using loans to total assets. Beltratti and Stultz (2009) found that loans make banks more profitable. Therefore, a positive sign for this variable is expected.
Off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities: is calculated by OBS items divided by total assets. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) emphasized that OBS activities can raise the volatility of bank's net operating revenue growth, so these activities have an adverse impact on bank profit. However, Calmès and Théoret (2010) realized that banks have fostered the financial deregulation process by shifting to more-profitable activities such as underwriting and securitization. Therefore, either positive or negative sign could appear.
Income diversification (INCDIV):
non-interest income to gross revenues is a proxy for income diversification. Stiroh (2004) also argued that non-interest income activities are more volatile than net-interest income activities. Hence, a negative sign is expected for this proxy.
Efficiency in expense management (COST): is defined as the operating costs divided by the gross income. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) prove that this ratio is negatively associated with bank performance. Following this paper, a negative sign is expected.
The vector accounts for the industry-level control variables and a variety of regulatory and supervisory factors defined as follows:
= (
Concentration indicator (CONC):
is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, which is computed by the sum of squared market shares in terms of total assets for each country in the sample, is a common indicator of market concentration. According to traditional StructureConduct-Performance hypothesis, concentration has a positive relationship with bank profitability (Valverde and Fernández, 2007) . However, Cetorelli and Gambera (2002) proves that bank profitability may be negatively affected by concentration due to the influence of third variables. Thus, a positive or negative relationship between concentration and bank performance is likely to be found.
Capital requirement (CAPITAL):
is defined as capital regulatory index. Barth et al's (2004) capital regulatory index refers to the stringency of capital regulation. It is derived from nine questions in a survey and a sum of two measures such as overall capital stringency and initial capital stringency. Its value ranges from 0 to 9, with higher value indicating greater capital stringency. Barth et al. (2004) mentioned that the regulators and supervisors find difficulty in setting the level of capital adequacy, which behaves in the same way as demanded by private-market participants. Beltratti and Stultz (2009) found that stricter capital regulation gains higher performance in the banking sector. Therefore, the same effect is expected.
Deposit insurance (DEPINS):
This proxy is deposit insurer power. Barth et al. (2004) assigned 1 (yes) or 0 (no) values to three questions assessing whether the deposit insurance authority has authority to intervene in a bank and to take legal action towards bank directors or officials. The sum of the assigned values ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more power. Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica (2002) proved that explicit deposit insurance can be harmful to bank stability, with the likelihood of banking crises. Thus, a negative relationship between deposit insurance and bank performance is expected.
Official supervisory power (OFFICIAL):
This variable is an official supervisory power index to examine whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to prevent and correct problems (Barth et al., 2004) . The sum of their assigned values may vary from 0 to 14, with higher values implying greater power. Pasiouras et al. (2009) argued that the proponents of the private interest view and the public interest view regarding government with powerful supervisors improve corporate governance of banks. Hence, a positive relationship between official supervision and bank performance is expected. Vento and Ganga (2009) examined few cases where public disclosure is stated in the regulatory policies to acknowledge banks' liquidity position. This proxy is the sum of four measures, including auditing related requirement, no explicit deposit insurance scheme, bank accounting, and whether credit ratings are required (Barth et al., 2004) . This variable ranges from 0 to 11 and higher values indicating more private oversight. Requirements of disclosures have a negative impact on efficiency because of direct cost incurred by releasing additional disclosures, preparing disclosure documents, maintaining investor relations departments, especially the cost related to releasing sensitive information to competitors (Duarte et al., 2008) . Hence, a negative relationship between private monitoring practices and bank performance may be expected.
Private monitoring practices (PRIVATE):
Restriction on bank activities (RESTRICT):
Bank activity regulatory variable is defined to measure the degree to which banks may engage in the following three fee-based activities, such as, securities, insurance and real estate activities. Barth et al. (2004) assessed each country's regulations concerning these activities and rated the degree of regulatory restrictiveness for each activity from 1 to 4, with larger numbers representing greater restrictiveness, including unrestricted, permitted, restricted and prohibited. Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) found that restrictions to engage in non-traditional activities such as real estate, securities underwriting, insurance, and own-financial firms help banks' margins become larger. Hence a positive sign is expected.
To avoid a potential uncertainty problem resulting from the bias of variables included, macroeconomic variables are introduced in the model. , GDP growth (GDP): annual GDP growth is used as a macroeconomic indicator to control for the country-level development, which can measure the quality of legal environment, regulation and supervision (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) .
Financial development (MACGDP and ASSGDP): stock market capitalization divided by GDP (MACGDP) and total assets of banks to GDP (ASSGDP) are captured. Naceur and Omran (2011) stated that, MACGDP measures the size of the equity market and its importance in financing the overall economy. Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) mentioned that, ASSGDP reflects the financial development of the banking industry and its crucial role of the bank financing in the economy. There could be positive or negative signs for these two financial development variables.
Foreign ownership (FOREIGN):
This variable is the share of foreign-controlled banks in the total number of banks operating in individual countries. Therefore, the foreign ownership proxy is included as a binary dummy variable equal to 1 for high foreign entry if the percentage of foreign banks in that country are larger than 50% or 0 otherwise.
The model given by Gorton and Huang (2004) and Allen and Gale (2004) , where bank runs due to loss of confidence in bank performance push re-sale liquidation of bank's assets, proves that liquidity is endogenously determined. These past arguments are in accordance with a concept of the endogeneity problem in term of liquidity risk and bank performance. This study is based on an assumption that bank performance is endogenously determined by liquidity risk. By the acknowledgement of the endogeneity problem, this paper has improved the model by including lagged values for bank-specific variables to potentially mitigate this problem. Hence, the R-squared gets higher results for all models, indicating that the limitation of prior studies has been addressed in this paper.
This empirical work employs the random effects model to address several reasons. Firstly, a number of time-invariant variables, which are FOREIGN, CAPITAL, DEPINS, OFFICIAL, PRIVATE and RESTRICT, cannot be estimated by using fixed effects model because they may be wiped out during the process of 'time demeaning' or within transformation. Secondly, the empirical test can avoid bias in any estimation due to an excess of these variables. Thirdly, random effects model is more economical in the degrees of freedom than fixed effects model, so cross-sectional intercepts may not have to be estimated (Gujarati, 2009) . 
Data Sample
The sample of the enlarged EU27 countries covers time series of 11 years from 2001 to 2011. Malta has no banks relative to this requirement, so Malta is omitted. In May 2004, the EU experienced the largest enlargement as 10 countries joined the EU, including Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania then entered the EU in January 2007. Because those countries have joined the EU, the structure of their banking industries have not been in line yet, so they could create outliers to the sample. Hence, extreme outliers are dropped. There is a point which Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia are removed from this outlier process. The sample then includes; 23 EU countries with the exception of Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia and 4114 banks.
In this data sample, the market-based countries are Denmark, Ireland, Netherland, Sweden, UK while the bank-based system includes Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain.
The bank-specific variables were obtained from the Bankscope. The information on the regulatory and supervisory variables was obtained from the World Bank database by Barth et al. (2001) relative to updated version in 2008. The country-specific controls were also obtained from the World Bank. By accessing a consolidated banking data of the European Central Bank, a number of foreign-controlled subsidiaries and branches and total number of banks were obtained to create foreign ownership dummy variable. Table 2 provides details on the dataset of the whole samples, bank-based and marketbased samples. More details of the descriptive statistics of each country are found in Table  3 . Table 2 indicates that banks in the market-based countries performed better than those in bank-based countries (3.26% and 2.63% respectively). It shows that banks in the marketbased countries tend to hold a larger share of the balance sheet in liquid assets than those in the bank-based countries (17.92% and 16.67% respectively). Also, the regulation and supervision system of the bank-based countries are stricter than that of the market-based countries because average CAPITAL, DEPINS, OFFICIAL, PRIVATE, RESTRICT of the bank-based countries are higher than those of the market-based counterparts. Most of the EU27 countries had interbank assets to interbank liabilities ratio greater than 100%, indicating that they were the suppliers of funds in the market place (Table 3) . Note: This tables reports summary statistics of variables for the whole sample, the bank-based countries and the market-based countries. N is number of bank-year observations. NIM is net interest margin. LIQ is liquid assets to total assets. INTER is interbank assets to interbank liabilities. SIZE is bank size. EQAS is equity to total assets. DEPOSIT is deposit to total assets. LOAN is loan to total off-balance sheet to total assets. INCDIV is non-interest income to gross revenues. COST is cost to income ratio. CONC is market concentration. CAPITAL is capital regulatory index. DEPOSIT is deposit insurer power. OFFICIAL is official supervisory power. PRIVATE is private monitoring. RESTRICT is restriction on bank activities. GDP is annual growth rate of GDP. MACGDP is market capitalization to GDP. ASSGDP is total assets of banks to GDP. FOREIGN is foreign-owned banks. Note: This table tabulates that the average of individual variable differs across countries and especially across two different financial systems (the bank-based system and the marketbased system). NIM is net interest margin. LIQ is liquid assets to total assets. INTER is interbank assets to interbank liabilities. SIZE is bank size. EQAS is equity to total assets. DEPOSIT is deposit to total assets. LOAN is loan to total off-balance sheet to total assets. INCDIV is non-interest income to gross revenues. COST is cost to income ratio. CONC is market concentration. CAPITAL is capital regulatory index. DEPOSIT is deposit insurer power. OFFICIAL is official supervisory power. PRIVATE is private monitoring. RESTRICT is restriction on bank activities. GDP is annual growth rate of GDP. MACGDP is market capitalization to GDP. ASSGDP is total assets of banks to GDP. FOREIGN is foreign-owned banks. Bank size, capital strength, the composition of the asset-side and liability side of the bank's balance sheet, income diversification, and efficiency in expenses management become main determinants of net interest margin due to high significant coefficients in all cases. In Regression (2) and (4) of Table 4 , large banks tend to earn lower net interest margin than small banks. Equity to total assets, deposit to total assets and loan to total assets enter positively and significantly at 1% level in all regressions. With regard to OBS activities, its coefficient exhibits a weak relationship with bank performance, however, it shows that the higher OBS activities a bank takes, the higher bank profits will increase. The relationship between non-interest income and bank performance is significantly negative, consistent with the result of Calmès and Théoret (2010).
Ly 22
Empirical Results
As expected, the coefficient of the cost-to-income ratio appears to be negative and significant at 1% level, indicating that the profits of EU27 banks reduces or increases when increasing or decreasing the expenses. As suggested in Regression (4) of Table 4 , the negative and statistically significant relationship between market capitalisation to GDP and profit margin shows that a larger stock market compared to the economy reduces bank profits.
It is interesting to note the impact of the bank financial characteristics, industry-level and country-level control variables in both the pre-crisis and post-crisis period (2001-2007 and 2008-2011, respectively) . Table 5 reports these results. The research question has been explained by the consistency in the negative relationship between liquidity risk and bank performance for the pre-and post-crisis period across twelve regressions in Table 5 . As indicated in Table 5 , all major explanatory and control variables in the sample of the precrisis period maintain their signs as in the whole sample with the exception of loan and OBS activities. To recall, the OBS market totally collapsed after the financial crisis, so this is the reason why OBS activities have no longer impact on bank performance after the crisis. With regard to country-level control factors, we found no evidence that market capitalisation, banking assets and foreign ownership have any significant spillover effects on bank performance after the financial crisis. After the crisis, banks that operate in the countries with high portions of banking assets to GDP no longer have larger margins and perform well as the previous period. Additionally, bank ownership is not significantly associated with bank performance for the distressed period. Table 6 presents the results of the impact of regulation, supervision and bank performance by using liquidity risk, the bank financial characteristics and the regulatory and supervisory variables as controlling at the industry level. Generally, the regulatory and supervisory factors maintain their signs in regressions of Table 6 . When being significant, the relationship between the regulatory and supervisory variables, including deposit insurance, official supervisory power, private monitoring, and restriction on bank activities are robust to Ly 23 control for the bank financial characteristics and other regulatory and supervisory policies. As of expectation, capital regulatory index displays a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Regression (2), consistent with the hypothesis H2 but not in Regression (1). This is consistent with an evidence provided by Chortareas et al. (2011) in which there is a positive relationship between capital requirements and bank performance, but this is not always statistically significant. However, this result differs from Barth et al. (2004) that found insignificant results.
Regulation that boosts deposit insurer power is negatively associated with bank performance, supporting the hypothesis H3. This finding has significantly contributed to the body of knowledge that when banks are subjected to deposit insurance scheme, it may harm bank profitability. Different from Barth et al.'s (2004) finding, the result shows consistency with the hypothesis H4 that official supervisory power index boosts up bank performance. In a similar finding with Barth et al. (2004) , private monitoring is negatively correlated with bank performance, consistent with the hypothesis H5.
Both regression (1) and (2) in Table 6 clearly indicate that bank activity restrictions substantively boost net interest margin, in line with the hypothesis H6. Barth et al. (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2003) also found that countries with regulatory restrictions on bank activities such as securities underwriting, insurance, owning non-financial firms and real estate, margin tends to be larger.
The financial structure is an important factor to determine the banking sector; therefore, the sample is divided into two sub-samples of bank-based and market-based countries for further analysis. As indicated in Table 7 , the coefficient of liquidity risk ratio is negatively significant in all results, so liquidity risk benefits are used in explaining bank performance in both bank-based and market-based countries. The bank-specific variables are found to be more statistically significant in the bank-based countries than in the market-based countries, particularly capital strength, deposit, and loan. The capital strength effect remains significant at 1% level in all situations of the bank-based countries, which states that banks in the bank-based countries rather than the market-based ones can earn profits by using capital. Evidence shows that the composition of liability side is only supported in the bankbased countries. Lending specification does not attain the expected sign and shows a weak relationship with bank performance in the market-based system. According to Yonezawa and Azeez (2010) , banks in the bank-based system occupy an important role in mobilising savings, allocating capital, providing risk management practices whereas the securities markets in the market-based countries share this centre stage with banks. Therefore, banks in the market-based countries tend to perform worse in lending specification.
At the industry-level, the impact of concentration is significant in all cases but get the opposite signs for the bank-based and the market-based countries. Regarding the marketbased financial system, concentration appears to be negatively and significantly associated with spread, implying that concentration is not necessary to be positively related to the spread as in the bank-based countries.
At the country-level, one could notice that the growth rate of GDP is positively linked to bank performance in the market-based countries while a negative one is found in the bankbased countries. Regarding the foreign ownership, banks in the market-based countries perform better than those in the bank-based counterparts. In fact, the stock market plays an important role in allocating capital in the market-based countries, so foreign capital easily transforms into much more market-based countries. So far, this facility enhances increasing capitalisation for banks in the market-based countries and their performance in the stock market as well.
Considering the regulatory and supervisory variables in Regression (4), (5), (9) and (10) of Table 7 , there are different effects of capital regulation and official supervision between the bank-based and the market-based countries. Capital standard causes a negative effect on the performance of banks in the bank-based countries, indicating that there are more barriers of capital adequacy requirement in the bank-based financial countries than in the market-based ones. Regulation and supervision of the bank-based countries is stricter than that of the market-based counterparts. Hence, the fact that regulators ask banks to hold more capital will raise banks' costs and make them less competitive, resulting in restriction on bank entry into the banking sector of the bank-based system (Steinherr, 1997) .
The results uncover a negatively significant relationship between the official supervisory power index and bank performance in both bank-based and market-based countries, but it is not always significant. The official supervision also works better in the market-based financial system than in bank-based. It is possibly explained that the bank-based countries enhancing the power of official supervision take excessive government involvement, leading to a reduction in the integrity of bank lending, so they have to deal with adverse implications on the efficiency of credit allocation (Beck et al., 2006) . These results are new to the body of literature and has answered the research question that the impact of regulation and supervision of bank performance differs from the bank-based to the marketbased countries.
In consideration of private monitoring practice, coefficients of this variable are mostly insignificant in the model of the bank-based countries while they are found to be negatively significant in that of the market-based countries. This result extends the study of Barth et al. (2004) by providing more evidence that the private monitoring policy does not benefit banks in the market-based countries. The results in regression (5) and (10) of Table 7 reveal a strong and statistically significant relationship between restrictions on bank activities and bank performance in the bank-based and market-based countries. However, there is no difference in this policy between the bank-based and the market-based system. Note: This table presents the regressions of the bank-specific, industry-level and country control variables on bank performance. Different regressions report the different combination of the independent variables. Regression (1) includes the main independent variable. Regression (2) presents liquidity risk and the bank-specific characteristics. Regression (3) includes liquidity risk, industry-level and country-specific variables. Regression (4) comprises liquidity risk, the bank financial characteristics, industry-level and country-specific variables. Regression (5), (6), (7) and (8) repeat the regressions with alternative liquidity risk ratio of interbank asset to interbank libabilties in Regression (1), (2), (3) and (4) respectively. *** and * denotes significance at 1% and 10%, respectively. [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] and after the financial crisis (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . Regression (1) and (4) examine the impact of liquidity risk and the bank financial characteristics on bank performance. Regression (2) and (5) investigate the impact of liquidity risk, the industry and the country-specific variables on bank performance. Regression (3) and (6) show the impact of liquidity risk, the bank financial characteristics, the industry and the country-specific variables on bank performance. The table presents number of observations, number of banks, overall R 2 and χ 2 -statistics. Regression (7)- (12) repeat the regressions in Regression (1)-(6), respectively with the alternative liquidity risk ratio of interbank assets to interbank liabilities. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. (4) repeat Regression (1)- (2), respectively with the alternative liquidity risk ratio of interbank assets to interbank liabilities. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Note: This table presents the relationships between liquidity, regulation, supervision and bank performance in the bank-based and the market-based countries. Different regressions include the different combination of independent variables. Regression (1) and (6) include liquidity risk and the bank-specific variables. Regression (2) and (7) include liquidity risk, concentration and the country-specific variables. Regression (3) and (8) comprise liquidity risk, the bank-specific variables, concentration and the country-specific variables. Regression (4) and (9) report liquidity risk and the regulatory and supervisory variables. Regression (5) and (10) include liquidity risk, the bank financial characteristics and the regulatory and supervisory variables. The table presents number of observations, number of banks, overall R 2 and χ 2 -statistics. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Note: This table presents the relationships between liquidity, regulation, supervision and bank performance in the bank-based and the market-based countries with the alternative liquidity risk (interbank assets/ interbank liabilities). Different regressions include the different combination of the independent variables. Regression (1) and (6) include liquidity risk and the bank-specific variables. Regression (2) and (7) include liquidity risk, concentration and the country-specific variables. Regression (3) and (8) comprise liquidity risk, the bank-specific variables, concentration and the country-specific variables. Regression (4) and (9) report liquidity risk and the regulatory and supervisory variables. Regression (5) and (10) include liquidity risk, the bank financial characteristics and the regulatory and supervisory variables. The table presents number of observations, number of banks, overall R 2 statistics. ***, ** and * denotes the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Measure of liquidity
Robustness Check
This section reports the robustness tests by employing the alternative liquidity risk of interbank assets to interbank liabilities in Regression (5)-(8) of Table 4 , Regression (7)- (12) of Table 5 and Regression (3)-(4) of Table 6 . Table 8 reports the robustness tests for Table  7 . Overall, these regressions exhibit a high overall R 2 around 20%, the models have an explanatory power as in the main analysis.
In general, the results for most of explanatory variables, including the bank financial characteristics, the industry-level and the country-level control variables agree with those where liquid asset to total assets ratio was a key explanatory variable for liquidity risk. In a similar vein, liquidity risk shown by interbank assets to interbank liabilities in Regression (5)- (8) of Table 4 is also negatively associated with bank performance. The possible explanation is that in the efficient interbank markets, the central banks should provide sufficient liquidity via the open market rather than lending to the individual banks. Additionally, some argue that there are some reasons causing the interbank markets to fail in allocating liquidity efficiently, such as asymmetric information about banks' assets (Freixas and Jorge, 2008; Flannery, 1996) and central bank's liquidity (Repullo, 2005) . The significant levels of some variables shown in Regression (7)- (12) of Table 5 are different; however, most of their signs are still holding with an exception of loan, market capitalisation to GDP and foreign ownership. As indicated in Regression (3)-(4) of Table 6 , the results for the impact of the bank-specific variables and the regulatory and supervisory practices are robust to the main results. 
Conclusion
In recent years, especially after the financial crisis 2007-2009, a wide range of factors have contributed to increase of liquidity problems in many countries and posed great challenges to banks. These issues have attracted much attention from researchers and policy makers back to the links between liquidity risk, regulation, supervision and bank performance. This research contributed to the existing literature by empirically investigating the impact of liquidity, regulation, and supervision on bank performance by using the bank-level data across the EU27 countries. Panel data of 4114 banks during the period 2001-2011 provided econometric analysis.
The results of a negative and statistically significant relationship between liquidity risk ratio and bank performance across all regressions indicated that banks with high level of liquid assets are unlikely to earn higher profits and these findings are in line with earlier studies. Bank size, income diversification and efficiency in expense management, GDP growth, market capitalisation to GDP and foreign ownership has a negative relationship with bank performance while capital strength, composition of asset side and liabilities side, OBS activities, concentration, assets of the banking sector to GDP are positively related to interest margins.
Regarding the regulation and supervision, including capital regulation, official supervision, and restriction on bank activities policies are positively related to bank performance while deposit insurance, private monitoring practices have a negative relationship with bank performance, inconsistent with the finding of Barth et al. (2004) . However, these findings support the hypothesis provided that, the impacts of capital requirement and official supervision are different from the bank-based and the market-based countries. Capturing capital requirement and increasing power to official supervisors are much preferred in the market-based than in the bank-based countries. Furthermore, the study fails to find a difference in bank activity restriction policy between the bank-based and the market-based system.
From a policy perspective, this study suggests that the policymakers should bear in mind the trade-off between the opportunity cost of holding low-yielding liquid assets and resilience to liquidity shocks. They should adopt capital regulation, official supervision and restriction on bank activities to improve the performance of the banking sector. Capital requirement and increasing power to offcial supervisors should be applied to banks in the market-based countries.
Due to limited availability of the data since some countries have recently joined the EU, the data sample includes 23 EU countries instead of 27 countries. This study has focused only on the bank's earnings as a measure for bank performance. Further research may be suggested to take a broad view of bank performance such as cost efficiency and profit efficiency.
